Game Theory and Antibiotic Resistance

I found an interesting article in Quanta Magazing discussing a 2012 paper in PNAS discussing game theory in the context of evolutionary processes. The article in Quanta is very detailed and nicely written as well as accessible.

This was interesting because in graduate school and other work I am familiar with, the context of games is defined around human-environment interactions leading to a Nash Equilibrium/prisoner's dilemma situation where the dominating strategies involve overuse of a given technology (antibiotics, herbicide resistant crops, insect resistant crops). In this context the equilibrium strategies create selection pressure which ultimately lead to insects, weeds, or bacteria that are resistant to the given technology. However, the Quanta article provides some examples where researchers are using game theory to describe actual behavior in nature (i.e. fish, monkeys, or the bacteria themselves). Here is a slice:

"For example, scientists studying antibiotic resistance are using a game theory scenario called the snowdrift game, in which a player always benefits from cooperating. (If you’re stuck in your apartment building after a blizzard, you benefit by shoveling the driveway, but so does everyone else who lives there and doesn’t shovel.) Some bacteria can produce and secrete an enzyme capable of deactivating antibiotic drugs. The enzyme is costly to produce, and lazy bacteria that don’t make it can benefit by using enzymes produced by their more industrious neighbors. In a strict prisoner’s dilemma scenario, the slackers would eventually kill off the producers, harming the entire population. But in the snowdrift game, the producers have greater access to the enzyme, thus improving their fitness, and the two types of bacteria can coexist."

Below is the citation related to the Dyson and Press paper discussed in the Quanta article:

Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012). Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109(26), 10409–10413. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109

Game Theory- Applications in Trait Resistance Managment

See also: Game Theory- Selected Works

In graduate school  (2005) some of the applied work I did focused on the idea of combining population genetics and game theory to model pest resistance to Bt traits in corn. Recently I decided to look at the literature in that space to see what others have been doing in this space. Below are some articles I have found from a quick search:

Press, William H., and Freeman J. Dyson. “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contains Strategies That Dominate Any Evolutionary Opponent.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109.26 (2012): 10409–10413. PMC. Web. 5 June 2017.

Miranowski, J.A., & Lacy, K.M. (2016). When do resistance management practices pay for the farmer and society? The case of Western Corn Rootworm. AgBioForum, 19(2), 173-183. Available on the World Wide Web: http://www.agbioforum.org.

Joel S Brown, Kateřina Staňková, Game theory as a conceptual framework for managing insect pests, Current Opinion in Insect Science, Volume 21, June 2017, Pages 26-32, ISSN 2214-5745, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cois.2017.05.007.

Jussaume, R., & Ervin, D. (2016). Understanding Weed Resistance as a Wicked Problem to Improve Weed Management Decisions. Weed Science, 64(SP1), 559-569. doi:10.1614/WS-D-15-00131.1

Ervin, D., & Frisvold, G. (2016). Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant Weed Management: Lessons from Science and Practice. Weed Science, 64(SP1), 609-626. doi:10.1614/WS-D-15-00122.1

Nicole Haynes McCoy, Pradyumna Amatya, Games People Play: Human Behavior and Invasive Weed Management, Rangelands, Volume 27, Issue 6, December 2005, Pages 8-14, ISSN 0190-0528, https://doi.org/10.2111/1551-501X(2005)27.6[8:GPP]2.0.CO;2.

Game Theory - Selected Works

In graduate school I looked at trait resistance management through  the lens of game theory. Below are some links to some related posts, references, and short articles that I have written.

Game Theory- TalkPython podcast

Game Theory- An Introduction

Matt Bogard. "An Econometric and Game Theoretic Analysis of Producer and Consumer Preferences Toward Agricultural Biotechnology" Western Kentucky University (2005) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/matt_bogard/31/

Matt Bogard. "An Introduction to Game Theory: Applications in Environmental Economics and Public Choice with Mathematical Appendix" (2012) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/matt_bogard/22/   

Matt Bogard. "Game Theory, A Foundation for Agricultural Economics" (2004) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/matt_bogard/32/ 

An Econometric and Game Theoretic Analysis of Producer and Consumer Preferences Toward Agricultural Biotechnology

It is no secret these days that there are anti-biotech activists that reject the science related to the safety and benefits of biotechnology but yet have no issues accepting the science related to climate change or other fields. In my early days, back in graduate school I hypothesized that beliefs about the safety of biotechnology were more related or driven by political constructs than knowledge or acceptance of science itself. This was crude (I wish I had the floppy with the actual paper...and a drive to read it) but my general findings were that those that believed in climate change or were supportive of stem cell research were less likely (45-50% less using the divide by 4 rule for marginal effects) to believe in the safety of biotech foods. 

Of course this work had some drawbacks, including small sample size and power. But also, after a few years on the job and working on a limited basis with structural equation modeling, there are more powerful methods I could have used looking at these effects. But I think it was an interesting preliminary finding that seems to still hold true almost a decade later.

See also:

Perceptions of GMO Foods: A Hypothetical Application of SEM 

Left vs Right Science vs Risk vs Propensity to Regulate 

Monsantophobia Explained

Reference:

Matt Bogard. "An Econometric and Game Theoretic Analysis of Producer and Consumer Preferences Toward Agricultural Biotechnology" Western Kentucky University (2005)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/matt_bogard/31/

 Abstract:

Agricultural biotechnology offers tremendous benefits to farmers and to society as it provides tools for mitigation of a number of environmental externalities related to water quality, food safety, and climate change. However, perceptions of the safety of recombinant DNA technology on the part of consumers and management decisions by producers can shape the policy environment in ways that may inhibit expanded use of biotech traits in agriculture. This presentation presents a summary of results from an econometric and game theoretic analysis of consumer perceptions and producer decisions as they relate to agricultural biotechnology.

Submitted in partial fulfillment of AGRI 597 Independent Study/Special Problems in Agriculture.

Internalizing Externalities Related to Herbicide Resistance

An example of a cooperative market based solution to internalizing negative externalities associated with herbicide resistance. (Note: Roundup Ready technology itself is an example of the price system and technological change working to internalize negative externalities associated with soil erosion, pollution, and climate change).

http://www.realagriculture.com/2013/03/basf-monsanto-team-up-to-encourage-tank-mixing/

"The two companies, in conjunction with retailers in Eastern Canada, are offering farmers a $1-per-acre rebate when RoundupWeatherMax is purchased with matching acres of Integrity, Eragon, Marksman or Armezon herbicides. These tank-mix partners, when applied together on the same fields, deliver multiple modes of weed-killing action while providing herbicide-resistance management."