The Role of Identify Protective Cognition in the Formation of Consumer Beliefs and Preferences

Background

People pick and choose their science, and often they do it in ways that seem rationally inconsistent. One lens through which we can view this is Bryan Caplan's idea of rational irrationality along with a Borland and Pulsinelli's concept of social harassment costs. 

According to Caplan:

 "...people have preferences over beliefs. Letting emotions or ideology corrupt our thinking is an easy way to satisfy such preferences...Worldviews are more a mental security blanket than a serious effort to understand the world."

This means that:

"Beliefs that are irrational from the standpoint of truth-seeking are rational from the standpoint of utility maximization."

In a previous post, I visualized social harassment costs that vary depending on one's peer group. If these costs exceed a certain threshold (k), consumers might express preferences that otherwise might seem irrational from a scientific standpoint. For example, based on peer group, a consumer might embrace scientific evidence related to climate change, but due to strong levels of social harassment, reject the views of the broader medical and scientific community related to the safety of genetically engineered foods. 

See here, and here.

Identity Protective Cognition

In Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition (Kahan, 2017) the concept of identity protective cognition adds more to the picture. Below are three aspects of identify protective cognition:

1. What people accept as factual information is shaped primarily by their values and identity
2. Identity is a function of group membership, i.e. it's tribal in nature
3. If people choose to hold beliefs that are different from what the 'tribe' believes, then they risk being ostracized (i.e. they face social harassment costs)
4. As a result, individual thinking and thought patterns evolve to express group membership and what is held to be factual information is really an expression of 'loyalty to a particular identity-defining affinity group.

Additionally Kahan discusses some important implications of this sort of epistemic tribalism. Additional education and more accurate information aren't necessarily effective tactics for addressing the problems of misinformation and disinformation. In fact, what Kahan's and others research have shown is that it can actually make the problem worse. 

'those highest in science comprehension use their superior scientific-reasoning proficiencies to conform policy-relevant evidence to the position that predominates in their cultural group....persons using this mode of reasoning are not trying to form an accurate understanding of the facts in support of a decision...with the benefit of the best available evidence....Instead they are using their reasoning to cultivate an affective stance that expresses their identity and their solidarity with others who share their commitments.' 

In this way, identity protective cognition creates a sort of spurious relationship between what may be perceived as facts and the beliefs we adopt or choices we make. It gives us the impression that our beliefs are being driven by facts when the primary driver may actually be cultural identity. 

This sort of tribalism can result in a sort of tragedy of the science communication commons - similar to the tragedy of the commons in economics where what seems rational from an individual standpoint (adopting the beliefs of the group to avoid punishment) is irrational from the standpoint of accuracy of beliefs and has negative consequences for society at large. As a result:

'citizens of a pluralistic democratic society are less likely to converge on the best possible evidence on threats to their collective welfare.'

Of course this has consequences for elections, the regulatory environment, and decisions by businesses and entrepreneurs in terms of what products to market and where to invest capital and resources. Ultimately this impacts quality of life and our ability to thrive in a world with a changing climate and bitter partisanship and social unrest. 

The Problem and the Solution

As discussed above, this sort of tribal epistemology is not easily corrected by providing correct information or education. In fact it drives one to seek out misinformation in support of one's identity while ignoring what is factually correct. The authors speak broadly about the role that 'pollutants' or 'toxins' in the science communication environment play in promoting this tribal mentality. One form of social harassment cost that may be driving this is cancel culture or call out culture. Cancel culture works like an immune system that scans the network of believers and seeks out non-conforming views, and tags it to be attacked by others in the group. This drives even the brightest to seek out misinformation instead of avoiding it. 

Another pollutant to the science communication environment is troll epistemology and related efforts to produce a 'firehose of falsehood' (see Paul and Matthews, 2016). Whether intentional or not, modern media technology provides the infrastructure to produce an effect similar to modern propaganda techniques pioneered in Russia.  This emphasizes flooding the science communication environment via high-volume and multichannel, rapid, continuous, and repetitive false or unsubstantiated claims with no commitment to objective reality or logical consistency. 

Authors conclude:

'the most effective manner to combat the effect of misconceptions about science and outright misinformation is to protect the science communication environment from this distinctive toxin.'

Related Posts and References

Borland,Melvin V. and Robert W. Pulsinelli. Household Commodity Production and Social Harassment Costs.Southern Economic Journal. Vol. 56, No. 2 (Oct., 1989), pp. 291-301

Frimer, J. A., Skitka, L. J., & Motyl, M. (2017). Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to one another's opinions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 72, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.04.003

Kahan, Dan M., Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition (May 24, 2017). Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper Series No. 164, Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 605, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 575, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973067

Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews, The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

The Limits of Nudges and the Role of Experiments in Applied Behavioral Economics

In a recent article in Nature, Evidence from a statewide vaccination RCT, authors found that eight different nudges previously shown to be effective for encouraging flu and COVID vaccination failed to show impact when tested on more reluctant populations. I think a knee jerk reaction is that maybe nudges aren't effective ways to increase vaccination after all. But that completely misses a very important aspect of nudges. Nudges work in most cases because humans can be sensitive to context. And applied behavioral design processes work to understand this context and test the impact of interventions to know if they are effective in a given context. At the highest level I think this paper is less about the ineffectiveness of nudges per say and more about the important role of changing context on behavior. 

I'd like to try to unpack more by focusing on the following: 

• The importance of testing. You can’t blindly chuck nudges over the fence at your customers and simply assume they will be effective just because they worked in prior published studies or in other businesses. In this paper they tested 8 different nudges. If they had just scaled any or all of these without testing we would not have learned anything about effectiveness or the other lessons that follow relating to why they may not have worked. And vice versa - just because something failed to replicate in one context doesn't invalidate prior work or imply it won't work in yours. We just know findings are not generalizable across all contexts. The only way to really know about your context is to test. That is part of the value of business experiments.

• Context matters. In the paper they discussed important differences in context between late stage COVID vaccination and vaccination earlier in the pandemic, as well as differences between flu and COVID.

• The utility of behavioral personas and behavioral mapping to guide our thinking about why a given nudge may work or not. To take context a bit further, authors discussed differences in populations (age) and different challenges to flu vs COVID vaccinations and the differential impact related to how both logistical and psychological barriers may have been addressed in different populations and different contexts with different designs. All of these are things that we can point to or think about in the framework of behavioral mapping. Other issues related to 1) different kinds of hesitancy and changing norms over time, 2) whether some participants may have already been vaccinated (and not mentioned perhaps how prior infection may have changed the sense of effectiveness or urgency). These things may relate more to the kinds of personas that any given nudge may speak to. Although the paper doesn't discuss behavioral mapping or developing personas their utility here seems palpable.

• Behavioral design frameworks. Additionally, authors discussed the impact of things like message saturation and novelty effects in addition to timing. These are things that I tend to think about in the context of Stephen Wendel’s CREATE action funnel as a design framework that speaks to issues like the importance of Cue and Timing. (Actually every aspect of CREATE speaks to almost all of the aspects of this messaging in some way).

• The importance of operationalizing applied behavioral science through repeatable iterative cycles of learning. Even if one constructed behavioral maps and personas in the design of these nudges, the findings in this paper (and in many instances where we leverage experiments to test impact) dictate that we go back and revise our maps and personas based on learnings like these.

There has also been some recent discussion about the failure of nudges because they focus too much on individual behavioral (i-frame) vs. larger systemic issues  (s-frame). It seems to me that best practices in the 'diagnosis' phase of behavioral design process would be helpful in both of these areas if the behavioral lens is widened to include deeper thinking about the broader system (s-frame). As discussed in The Consitution of Knowledge: A Defence of Truth Jonathan Rouch discusses the challenges of changing behavior when beliefs and identity become tightly braided together. Sometimes people first have to be moved to a 'persuadable place emotionally' and their 'personal opinions, political identities, and peer group norms' have to be 'nudged and cajoled simultaneously, which is a long slow process.' To quote Jim Manzi, you can't test your way out of a bad strategy. It does not mean that we should give up on leveraging applied behavioral science to make a positive change in society, but it does make understanding of the larger ecosystem in the implementation of nudges all the more critical. 

As discussed in a recent article in The Behavioral Scientist:

"Our efforts at this stage will determine whether the field matures in a systematic and stable manner, or grows wildly and erratically. Unless we take stock of the science, the practice, and the mechanisms that we can put into place to align the two, we will run the danger of the promise of behavioral science being an illusion for many—not because the science itself was faulty, but because we did not successfully develop a science for using the science." 

The authors follow with 6 guidelines echoing some of the above sentiments above that are well worth reading. 

Reference: 

Rabb, N., Swindal, M., Glick, D. et al. Evidence from a statewide vaccination RCT shows the limits of nudges. Nature 604, E1–E7 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04526-2

Chater, Nick and Loewenstein, George F., The i-Frame and the s-Frame: How Focusing on Individual-Level Solutions Has Led Behavioral Public Policy Astray (March 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4046264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4046264

Agricultural Economics in the Healthcare Space

During the pandemic, it wasn't too uncommon to hear the criticism that economists should stay in their lane when it comes to issues related to health. So I thought I would write a short piece discussing what role I have had as an applied (agricultural) economist working in the healthcare space for almost a decade now. 

Economics is the study of people's choices and how they are made compatible. At a high level, agricultural economics focuses on choices related to food, fiber, natural resources, and energy production and consumption. This makes the intersection of food, health, and the environment an interesting space in agricultural economics. 

How do choices in this space impact health? What factors lead individuals to make healthy choices? In graduate school I specifically focused on why people seem to pick and choose their science and the role of evidence in food choices and attitudes toward food technology. What is the role of information and disinformation in the formation of consumer preferences and the choices they make? How can we design better policies, products, services, interventions, or choice architectures for better outcomes? How can we communicate science and risk more effectively? And, what are the best approaches in experimental design and causal inference to measure the impact in these areas? How do we bring this all together to make better decisions as individuals, business leaders, and as a society? At an applied level, which is where I work, this is not so much about making a novel contribution to the literature or advancing the field as much as it is about implementation - applying the principals of economics to develop solutions or provide frameworks to solve or better understand questions and problems in this space.

This line of reasoning has value not just in the context of food choices but for a myriad of behaviors related to healthcare at both the patient and provider level. From a business perspective, this is about how to identify opportunities to move resources from a lower to a higher valued use, and how we monetize behavior change. Of course applying this economic lens also requires bringing an ethical perspective to the table as well, which is important when we consider all of the tradeoffs involved in human decision making. 

When we are faced with wicked problems that may have alternative solutions, we can't just jump directly form the science to a cure, better policy, or product or service.  We learned from the pandemic the difference between having a vaccine and having people get vaccinated. At the end of the day there are no solutions really, only tradeoffs, and we need a framework for understanding those tradeoffs so we can make better decisions about food and health. That is squarely in the lane of theoretical and applied economists.

Related Posts and Readings

Why Study Economics / Applied Economics 

The Convergence of AI, Life Sciences, and Healthcare

The Economics of Innovation in Biopharma

Science Communication for Business and Non-technical Audiences 

The Value of Business Experiments

Statistics is a way of thinking not a toolbox

Causal Decision Making with Non-Causal Models

Rational Irrationality and Behavioral Economic Frameworks for Combating Vaccine Hesitancy 

Consumer Perceptions, Misinformation, and Vaccine Hesitancy

Using Social Network Analysis to Understand the Influence of Social Harassment Costs and Preferences Toward Biotechnology

Fat Tails, The Precautionary Principle, and GMOs

Innovation, Disruption and Low(er) Carbon Beef

Examining Changes in Healthy Days After Health Coaching. Cole, S., Zbikowski, S. M., Renda, A., Wallace, A., Dobbins, J. M., & Bogard, M. American Journal of Health Promotion. (2018)

Intrapersonal Variation in Goal Setting and Achievement in Health Coaching: Cross-Sectional Retrospective Analysis. Wallace A.M., Bogard M.T., Zbikowski S.M. J Med Internet Res 2018;20(1):e32